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Abstract
In this paper a model of aggregate investment is derived which incorporates …xed investment costs
and capital market imperfections on the micro-level. Aggregate investment reacts nonlinearily with
respect to aggregate shocks to productivity and liquidity of …rms. Employing non-parametric kernel
estimation methods to analyze a sample of annual account data of UK companies, these nonlinearities
also show up empirically.
Furthermore a di¤erence in strength between the long- and the short-run e¤ect of liquidity on
investment is found, which is inconsistent with models that explain the empirical correlation of in-
vestment and liquidity solely as the result of some long-run relationship like liquidity-dependent
costs-of-capital. Moreover, as a side-result when imposing a linear structure, we …nd, as reported
in previous studies, that …nancially constrained …rms appear to be less in‡uenced by liquidity than
unconstrained ones. However, this …nding disappears when the investment function is estimated
without any restrictions on the functional form and thus has to be attributed to a misspeci…cation
error, which is avoided by the estimation strategy of this paper.
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Economists knowledge of micro-level and aggregate investment is still far from being con-
clusive. The only thing seemingly well established is the empirical rejection of the standard
neoclassical investment model.1 Which assumption of the neoclassical model leads to its
failure to what extend is yet to be found.
Beginning with Fazzari et al. (1988) the empirical literature has emphasized the role of
…nancial factors in …rm-level investment. More recently attention has been drawn to the role
of non-convexities in the investment technology. This paper aims at merging both strands of
the literature and shows that both, …nancial factors and non-convexities are not only each
important, but also each important for the e¤ect of the respective other and therefore play
both a prominent role in determining micro-level investment. Yet, this interaction has not
been analyzed up until very recently: Holt (2003) provides a theoretical real options model
of irreversible investment that shows how …nancial frictions and irreversibility of investment
work as complementaries, Whited (2003) provides evidence that …rms which are identi…ed
as …nancially constrained exhibit investment spikes much less frequent, and Cagese (2003)
develops a formal test for …nancial constraints based on the irreversibility of …xed investment.
Our approach di¤ers in both methodology and focus from these studies: Firstly, we focus
on the di¤erential impact of liquidity on the optimal stock of capital and on investment to
discriminate between various types of …nancial frictions. While we …nd only a very minor
impact of liquidity on optimal capital, liquidity substantially speeds up investment. This
e¤ect apparently would be absent in a partial adjustment framework with liquidity-dependent
costs of capital. Secondly, we use information on cross- and second-order derivatives to test
for the di¤erent adjustment costs and …nancial frictions models. Moreover and as some side
result, we show that omitting the interaction of liquidity and …xed adjustment cost can lead
to a severe misspeci…cation bias, by which the most constrained …rms actually look least
reactive to changes in liquidity.
Although the interaction we want to study is rather unanalyzed, non-convexities them-
selves such as irreversible investment or …xed costs of investment and other economies of
scale have widely been discussed and have lately been theoretically analyzed in a very gen-
eral framework by Abel and Eberly (1994). Non-convexities in the adjustment costs typically
lead to an expected investment function that is convex in the underlying fundamentals.
Empirical evidence for non-convexities is mostly drawn from the Longitudinal Research
Database (LRD): E.g. Doms and Dunne (1998) report that on the plant-level a small fraction
of investment activities is associated with a large fraction of changes in the capital stock.
Cooper et al. (1999) use the LRD to estimate a hazard model of investment and …nd a
1 See Caballero (2000).
1time-increasing investment hazard and thus evidence for non-convexities. A more direct
approach has been taken by Caballero et al. (1995): Again using the LRD, they estimate a
measure of ”mandated investment” by imposing a long-run or cointegration relation between
earnings, capital employed and the cost of capital. Explaining actual investment by mandated
investment in a second stage, they empirically …nd a convex relationship between mandated
and actual investment, which is inconsistent with the convex adjustment cost (and perfect
capital market) framework - the neoclassical investment theory. Recently, there also has been
additional evidence for non-convexities, drawn from other data than the LRD.2
Discussing the in‡uence of micro-level non-convexities on aggregate investment, Caballero
and Engel (1999) present a model of …rm-level and aggregate investment that incorporates
…rm-speci…c stochastic adjustment costs and (to a certain degree) heterogeneous production
functions. They estimate the resulting aggregate investment dynamics on the basis of 2-digit
industry level panel data and obtain a better …t with their structural model than with any
(simple) partial adjustment or other autoregressive models.
The empirical literature on …nancial factors in investment3 has recently been tackled by
a series of papers4 emphasizing the problem of measurement errors and biased estimators
based on q-theoretical regressions. Most disappointing for the …nancial factors in investment
literature are the results of Gomes (2001): In a pecking order of …nance framework he shows
that the presence of …nancial frictions is neither su¢cient nor necessary to obtain seemingly
signi…cant positive coe¢cients on cash ‡ows in a q-theoretic investment regression.5 There-
fore, in this paper we follow an approach that is not subject to Gomes’ critique; we …rstly
do not rely on a q-measure and secondly do not use cash-‡ow to identify the extent of the
…nancial constraint but the within variation of the equity ratio as the stock of liquidity. By
using the within variation, we control for di¤erent baseline access to capital across …rm but
2 Abel and Eberly (2002) employ the Compustat data in a q-theoretic framework - their (1994) augmented
adjustment cost model - and …nd evidence for non-convexities in the capital adjustment technology, especially
for …xed costs. Goolsbee and Gross (2000) use micro-level airline industry data within the framework of
Caballero et al. (1995) and …nd evidence for a convex investment-function. However, this evidence vanishes
by aggregation - even on the airline (company) level there is nearly no evidence for non-convex adjustment
costs.
3 For a very exhaustive survey over the literature on capital market imperfections and investment see
Hubbard (1998).
4 See for instance Kaplan and Zingales (1997), Cummins et al. (1999), Erickson and Whited (2000) or
Gomes (2001)
5 The explanation for this can be summarized in the following way: On the one hand measurement errors
can cause the regressor on cash ‡ow to be positive without any …nancial frictions. On the other hand, true
marginal q already (partly) measures the impact of …nancial frictions - if such indeed exist. A good applied
example for the latter e¤ect can be found in a paper of Cummins et al. (1999) in which a so called ”real
q” is constructed using analyst’s EBIT forecasts. While ”real q” is signi…cant in explaining investment, cash
‡ow is insigni…cant and the estimated parameter is negative. Interestingly the variable ”real q” is (partly by
construction) highly correlated with the current cash ‡ow. Therefore, the regression results do not say much
about whether it is fundamental e¤ects or the value of internal funds that drive ”real q”. Moreover, ”real q”
will even have measurement error positively correlated with cash ‡ow, if analysts’ cash ‡ow forecast errors
were positively correlated with actual cash ‡ow, e.g. due to omitted variables.
2assume that all …rms can in general be subject to a …nancing constraint.
Yet, there are other studies that …nd …nancial factors in investment and rely on more
directly measuring capital productivity instead of focusing on q-theory. Examples for this
strand of literature are Bond and Meghir (1994) or Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1998).6
Additionally to his scepticism on …nancial frictions Gomes (2001, p. 1279) also points
out that the pecking order theory of …nance ”[...] is somewhat similar to those used in the in-
vestment with …xed cost literature.”—depending on the speci…cation. Therefore, by ignoring
…nancial variables we might obtain a convex investment function in fundamentals only due to
…xed costs of …nancing activities, even if cost of adjusting real capital are absent. Even worse,
the similarity between the …nancial frictions and the …xed costs of investment framework also
holds the other way round, i.e. the standard (S,s) investment-model already produces some
correlation between investment and cash-‡ow.7 Therefore, any empirical formulation of an
investment function should not only use a more direct measure of fundamental investment
incentives than Tobin’s q to avoid measurement error bias, but should also allow for both
…nancial frictions and non-convex adjustment costs simultaneously to avoid misspeci…cation
bias.
As brie‡y stated above there seems to be another empirical puzzle apparent in the lit-
erature which can be tackled by incorporating …nancial frictions in a model of …xed capital
adjustment costs: Liquidity seems to a¤ect investment much more in the short than in the
long run. This evidence becomes even stronger when investment is estimated as an error-
correction-process.8
As long as liquidity is measured as cash ‡ow, this is easily explainable, but e.g. Guariglia
(1999, pp.47) …nds that …rm size and stock based liquidity proxies are empirically indepen-
dent, so there can be no long run relation. However, she does not comment on this point.
Moreover it is not quite clear whether cash-‡ow is a correct measure for liquidity or if a
proxy for the line-of-credit would be preferable (Blinder, 1988, p. 199). If agency or other
informational market imperfections are the driving force of the investment liquidity correla-
tion, then the correct measure should be a stock- and not a ‡ow-item and the dependency
should appear mainly in the long run. If …xed transaction costs are the driving force of the
liquidity dependence,9 we would expect …rms to have the same marginal cost-of-capital and
thus the same long run capital stock regardless how indebted they are. Therefore, allowing
6 Although Gilchrist and Himmelberg call their regressors ”fundamental q” and ”…nancial q”, these are
measures of capital productivity and the shadow costs of internal funds and are only loosely related to q-theory.
7 To see this, suppose that the productivity-of-capital-process being a random walk. Because of the ”region
of inactivity” in the (S,s) model …rms usually invest (disinvest) only after a series of positive (negative) changes
in capital-productivity. However these changes in productivity correspond to a series of rises (falls) in cash-
‡ow.
8 See e.g. Hubbard (1998) or Mairesse et al. (1999) for an overview of the empirical literature on …rm-level
investment and the time structure of liquidity e¤ects.
9 See Gomes (2001) and Bond and Meghir (1994, p. 206).
3for di¤erent impacts of liquidity in the short and in the long run, as will be done in this
paper, can help to empirically distinguish between the transaction cost and the imperfect
information view. Whether liquidity should be measured by a stock or a ‡ow is ambiguous in
a transaction cost framework. Therefore, the equity-ratio, a stock item, is used in this paper,
because it proxies future pro…tability to a much lesser extent than cash ‡ow does (Gilchrist
and Himmelberg, 1998, p.28) and thus causes less econometric problems once one controls
for …rm-speci…c baseline access to capital markets.
The starting point of this paper is a theoretical model in which the interaction of …xed in-
vestment costs and …nancing constraints is studied. The model is based upon the Caballero
and Engel (1999) model of lumpy investment. This model is modi…ed to incorporate an
imperfect capital market as e.g. in Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1998). It yields possibility re-
sults which are strikingly di¤erent to existing investment models: In contrast to models with
informational imperfections and continuous, convex adjustment costs expected investment
rates may react more sensitively to the equity-ratio than the optimal stock of capital does. In
contrast to pecking order of …nance and convex adjustment cost models, the model predicts
investment to be more sensitive to …nancial factors with increasing fundamental investment
incentives. In contrast to pure non-convex adjustment cost models, there is an in‡uence of
liquidity on investment. Discussing the behavior of aggregate investment, it is shown that,
although …rm level investment behaves lumpily, aggregate investment is a smooth function
in fundamentals.
When estimating investment non-parametrically from UK company accounts all the pre-
dicted e¤ects show up empirically. Therefore, the alternative models mentioned before are
rejected, while the model presented remains as an explanation. Especially the empirical
larger sensitivity of investment than the sensitivity of capital on the equity-ratio supports
the theoretical model.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In section 2.1 a model that describes
…rm level investment under the assumption of capital market imperfections and …xed costs
of investment is presented. In sections 2.2 and 2.3 the expressions for sectoral investment
and its derivatives, and for aggregate investment and its dynamics are derived. Section 3
empirically assesses our model using …rm level investment data. Section 4 concludes and an
appendix follows.
42 A theoretical model
2.1 Firm-level investment
We will start o¤ with presenting and discussing the representative problem of a …rm which is
at the same time subject to …nancial constraints and …xed adjustment costs .10 For simplicity
and as in Caballero and Engel (1999), the industry modelled in this chapter shall consist of a
large number of monopolistically competitive single-plant and single-product …rms which all
are subject to a limited liability constraint. The investment decision is modelled in discrete
time. Each …rm faces an in…nitely elastic supply of all factors. At the beginning of each
period all uncertainty about that period is resolved and is common knowledge from then on.
Thereafter, each …rm decides upon investment.
2.2 Adjustment technology and …nancial constraint
If a …rm wants to change its capital stock it has to pay some …xed costs; all other factors
may be adjusted without costs. At the end of every period each …rm has to pay back its last
period’s debt plus interest, has to pay for any new purchased capital goods and for all other
factors. Moreover, it can issue new debt and pay out dividends.
Apart from the non-convexity in the investment technology, …rms face a capital market
imperfection: As in Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1998) and as an extremely simpli…ed version
of the pecking order of …nance theory, there shall be a no-new-equity constraint, i.e. …rms
are unable to issue new shares or to have negative dividends once founded (which is in the
absence of taxation equivalent on the margin):
Assumption 1: Once founded, …rms are unable to issue new equity. Especially, dividend
payments Dt must be non-negative at any point in time: 8t : Dt ¸ 0:
This simpli…ed version of the pecking order theory is necessary to keep the model tractable.
Nevertheless, the general results should not change if this assumption were replaced by a more
complex version as in Gomes (2001).
Moreover and more important, this assumption is not strongly contradicted by empirical
…ndings as e.g. Friedman (1982) shows empirically that …rms hardly use any external equity
…nance at all. Moreover this assumption also has theoretical support: Fries et al. (1997)
10 Note that typically the investment-functions in investment problems with …xed cost are not aggregable.
Hence we can only discuss the typical investment problem - of course given a parameterization of the pro-
duction technology, market structure etc. If these parameters vary across …rms, this makes the aggregation
problem more severe. This is quite analoguous to the aggregation problem in consumer-theory.
Moreover, when relating investment to consumer theory it should be noted, that under …nacial frictions,
the ”law of supply” obviously does no longer necessarily hold as …rms then face a budget constraint.
5show how full collataralization- and ”no new equity”-constraints may theoretically arise as
an industry equilibrium.
Secondly, we assume that a …rm must declare bankruptcy immediately if it has a negative
book value of equity (at any point of time). Under assumption 1 this is equivalent to a full
collataralization constraint, i.e., the amount of debt a …rm may issue is limited by the actual
stock of capital depreciated and discounted for one period.11 To see the equivalence, suppose
a …rm would borrow above the constraint. Then the …rm would be bankrupt next period.
Hence, either all assets were transferred to the debtholders who continue operations or debt
burden had to be renegotiated. Any combination of the two would contradict assumption 1.
However, both procedures would imply a sure loss either for the stock- or the debtholders.
Thus, at least one party will never allow for any increase in debt beyond that ceiling.
Assumption 2: The maximum debt Bt+1 (repayable in period t+1) a …rm may issue in
p e r i o dti sr e s t r i c t e db yt h eb o o kv a l u eo ft h es t o c ko fc a p i t a lKt, depreciated (with rate









The third, last, and weakest assumption regarding capital market imperfections is that
the interest rate on debt r only depends on the leverage. As Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1998),
we assume r to be homogenous of degree zero in B and K; and to be weakly increasing in
B: This does not rule out r to be independent of B and K:












Now let K¤ denote the frictionless stock of capital of a …rm, i.e., the stock of capital that
w o u l db ec h o s e ni nt h ea b s e n c eo f… x e dc o s t sf o ri n v e s t m e n ta n dc a p i t a lm a r k e ti m p e r f e c t i o n s .
Let K be the actual capital employed.
T h es e m i - r e d u c e df u n c t i o no fe a r n i n g sp e r - p e r i o d( E B I T ) ,¦; shall be linear homogenous
in the frictionless stock of capital K¤ and can be written as:12
¦(z;K¤)=¼(z)K¤; (1)
with z denoting the capital-imbalance at the beginning of each period before investment
takes place, i.e. the ratio of actual capital employed to frictionless capital, K
K¤:¼shall be
11 This ensures that the …rm always has a positive present value in the following period and will stop
production before going bankrupt. Alternatively, this assumption can be viewed as a simpli…cation of Hart
and Moore’s (1994) debt capacity model.
12 This assumption and the assumptions below with respect to ¼ are e.g. ful…lled if demand is iso-elastic
and the production function is Cobb-Douglas. See Caballero and Engel (1999) for details.
6strictly concave and ful…ll the (Inada) conditions ¼(0) = 0 and lim
z!0
¼0(z)=+ 1.M o r e o v e r ,
assume lim
z!+1¼0(z) <Ã ±to make pro…ts bounded. Ã denotes the discount factor.
When a …rm invests, it faces a stop of production. The duration of this stop is determined
by the random variable w 2 ]0;1[ which represents the fraction of the period used for the
installation of the new capital—similar to the adjustment costs assumption in Caballero and
Engel (1999). So the costs, A; of adjusting the capital stock are given by:
A(kt;K¤
t ;w t): =wt¼(kt)K¤
t ; (2)
where kt denotes the capital-imbalance after adjustment, kt := Kt+Investmentt
K¤
t .N o t et h a ti n
the presence of depreciation the …rm will typically invest up to a larger stock of capital than
the frictionless optimal one, K¤
t :
2.2.2 Dynamics of the stochastic variables
So far there are no restrictions on the stochastic dynamics of the random variables K¤
t and wt.
Both variables together completely determine …rm heterogeneity and investment dynamics,
so any assumptions on these variables are crucial. A minimal assumption for keeping the
model tractable is that both variables exhibit the Markov property.13 Furthermore, we shall
assume that wt is i.i.d. and that K¤
t follows a geometric random walk (with drift d). The
innovations »t to K¤






=e x p( d + »t): (3)
2.2.3 Capital market and the …rm’s objective
Firms are assumed to be risk-neutral. Therefore, they seek to maximize the expected, dis-
counted dividend stream. They do so by choosing some capital-imbalance kt (respectively
the amount of capital employed, ktK¤
t ) and the amount of debt used to …nance production,
Bt+1.
In order to …nance investment, a …rm can either cut back dividend payments Dt or raise
debt Bt+1. As assumed, a …rm is unable to sell any new shares or raise equity by negative
dividends (assumption 1). Moreover, the amount of debt a …rm can issue is limited by the
actual stock of capital employed (assumption 2). Additionally, the interest rate is a function
13 If shocks to productivity would be serially correlated, the analysis would just be complicated. Managers
would have a true optimal stock of capital that is di¤erent from the one that maximizes current pro…ts. This
would make the …nancing problem more pronounced.
7of bt := Bt
Kt¡1 and is weakly increasing in bt (assumption 3).14 Therefore, dividend payments,
Dt; are given by
Dt = D(kt;B t+1;K¤
t ;w t;z t;B t)
:= ¦(kt;K¤
t ) ¡ A(kt;K¤
t ;w t)Ifkt6=ztg ¡ K¤
t (kt ¡ zt)+Bt+1 ¡ (1 + rt)Bt (4)
in which I is an indicator function. Moreover, let the time constant discount factor be
denoted by Ã a n dt h ev a l u eo ft h e… r mb ed e n o t e db yV:Then the following Bellman equation
determines both V and the optimal investment policy:
V (K¤





t ;w t;z t;B t)+ÃEt[V (K¤
t+1;w t+1;z t+1;B t+1)]
ª
: (5)
In this expression X := X (K¤
t ;w t;z t;B t) is the correspondence of …nancially feasible
capital-imbalance and debt pairs. Et denotes the expectations operator, conditional on in-
formation available at time t.
To reduce the number of state variables and to obtain a more convenient formulation
of the problem at hand, we subtract the book value of equity from V and divide by K¤
t :
This de…nes a new value function v := V
K¤
t ¡ etzt; which is the di¤erence between ”market-
value” and book-value of equity relative to the optimal stock of capital. The ratio of equity
to capital can be expressed as et := e(bt):15 As both et and K¤
t are determined before the
optimal policy decision is taken, maximizing v and maximizing V yield the same optimal
policy.
Now, de…ne …rm value ~ v as v if the capital imbalance is not altered by investment in the
current period. Rearranging terms,16 we obtain












For capital-imbalance and debt pairs (”plans”) with strictly positive capital we de…ne Y
14 That the interst-rate for bonds increases does not follow from our model but is an assumption. And as
we have explicitely ruled out bancruptcies, debt is even risk-free. Hence, the assumption in its strong form
itself is somewhat inconsistent with the model. Yet, to rule out risky debt is only to simplify and concentrate
the analysis. Introducing another risk-term that enters after the investment decisions are made and adding
bancruptcy costs for the debt-holders would generate an upward sloping interest-function, but would only
complicate the analysis a lot.
15 See appendix for details.
16 Again, see appendix.
8to be the correspondence of …nancially feasible plans in terms of k and b :
Y (wt;z t;e t)
:=
n
(kt;b t+1) 2 R++ £ R+jkt ¡ etzt ¡ ¼(kt)[1 ¡ wtIfkt6=ztg] · ktbt+1 · ktb b
o
: (7)
The …rst inequality represents the positive dividend constraint and the second inequality
represents the debt-ceiling, in which b b denotes the maximum debt-to-capital ratio
b b := sup
½





The following Lemma proves to be useful in order to write the Bellman equation (5) in terms
of k and b in a short and accessible form. Basically the Lemma states that it is always
possible and pro…table to avoid bankruptcy in our model. That default is not pro…table is
due to the monopoly rents the …rm would forgo by defaulting.
Lemma 1 (a) Y is non-empty and
( b )e m p l o y i n gz e r oc a p i t a li ss u b o p t i m a l ,i . e .
max
(kt;bt)2Y
~ v(kt;b t) ¡ ¼(kt)wtIfkt6=ztg >Ã Et[v(wt+1;0;0) > 0
Proof. See appendix:
Because of the above Lemma, …rms never stop production completely respectively declare
bankruptcy.17 Therefore, the optimal policy is always an element of Y and thus the Bellman
equation de…ning v is given by:
v(wt;z t;e t)= m a x
(kt;bt+1)2Y (wt;zt;et)
~ v(kt;b t+1) ¡ ¼(kt)wtIfkt6=ztg .( 8 )
2.2.4 Adjustment process
In general, Y is only upper-hemicontinuous, thus v might not be continuous everywhere. The
lack of continuity arises because of the …xed adjustment costs: If a …rm employs a large stock
of capital and is heavily indebted, it may …nd itself unable to repay the debt obligations if
the capital-imbalance or the debt level rise marginally. Therefore, it will be necessary to
distinguish two cases when describing …rm level investment:
17 This result seems a contradiction to empirical facts at a …rst glance, i.e. of course in reality …rms do
declare bankruptcy and are shut down. However, Lemma 1 should not be taken literally as ”…rms never
disappear”. Basically the Lemma states, that the monopoly power of a …rm is always of some value, which
would be lost upon bankruptcy. Hence, the Lemma may better be interpreted as ”brands never disappear”,
which surely comes closer to reality than the former interpretation.
9(a) The …rm is in danger of becoming insolvent: this happens, if
1 ¡ et ¡
¼(zt)
zt
> b b .( 9 )
In this case the …rm has a negative cash ‡ow and cannot sustain the actual level of capital
employed by issuing new debt. Therefore, it has to (heavily) cut back production to increase
its average productivity. In consequence, a …rm always disinvests if in …nancial distress.
(b) The …rm is not in danger of becoming insolvent:
Then, denoting the (optimal) capital-imbalance after adjustment with zopt and the ratio
of debt to capital after adjustment with bopt; a …rm adjusts its stock of capital (i.e. it invests)




~ v(zt;b t+1) ¡ ~ v(zopt;b opt)+¼(zopt)wt (10)
Z(zt;e t):=
½
bt+1 2 R++j1 ¡ et ¡
¼(zt)
zt










As shown in the appendix, the value of a …rm that adjusts is monotonically decreasing in
wt; so that for every (et;z t) there exists an unique trigger ¹ w such that
~ v(zopt(wt;e t);b opt(wt;e t)) ¡ w¼(zopt(w;et))
| {z }





Value when only readjusting …nance




Having reduced the …rm’s investment decision to a comparison of two values, it is now possible
to de…ne for every (et;z t) a critical value ­ which is the largest value of the stoppage duration





if Z (zt;e t) 6= ;
if Z (zt;e t)=;
(13)
As only contemporary state variables matter for the aggregation, the time indices of state
variables are suppressed henceforth. Let KA
t ;IA
t ;K t(e;z);I t(e;z) denote the aggregate stock
of capital, aggregate gross investment, and the stock of capital and gross investment of
…rms with capital-imbalance z and equity-to-capital-ratio e (sectoral aggregates) in period t;
respectively. Moreover, let G(w) be the distribution of w: Then the investment hazard can
be de…ned as ¤(e;z): =G(­(e;z)) and we can de…ne
e zopt(e;z): =¤ ( e;z)¡1
­(e;z) Z
zopt(w;e;z)dG(w); (14)
which is the average optimal capital-imbalance of …rms that invest conditional on having an
equity-ratio e and capital-imbalance z before investment.
At time t investment of …rm j with capital-imbalance zjt and equity ejt that adjusts
indeed is given by








Therefore, with these quantities at hand, the expected (cross-sectional) investment condi-








Since adjustment-cost shocks w are i.i.d., the cross-sectional average investment rate i(e;z)











Di¤erentiating average investment i with respect to the equity-ratio e yields an interesting
18 Since w is always smaller than one, ­(z;e)=const ¸ 1 implies that a …rm adjusts independent of its
realized w. Furthermore, as a …rm always disinvests if it is in danger of becoming insolvent (:, Z = ;),
­(z;e)=1 is a sensible value if Z = ;:
















(e zopt(e;z) ¡ z)
z
@¤(e;z)
@e | {z }
frequency-e¤ect
(18)
While the …rst term represents a long-run or level e¤ect of the equity-ratio, the second
term represents an only short run or frequency e¤ect. The latter e¤ect is only short-run since
an increase in ¤ decreases the variance of the cross sectional capital-imbalance and therefore
later on decreases the probability of investment. Due to this frequency e¤ect investment can
be more sensitive to the …nancial situation than the optimal stock of capital is:
Theorem 1 (a) If [i(e;z)+¤ ( e;z)] is large enough20—but possibly smaller than one—then
the investment rate is more sensitive to the equity-ratio than the optimal stock of capital,
i.e. the elasticity of e zopt w.r.t. the equity-ratio is smaller then the semi-elasticity of the


















































As z and e enter Y only multiplicatively and as Y determines zopt(w;e;z);
@2e zopt
@z@e can be
19 Proposition 4 in the appendix shows that @­
@~ e exists almost everywhere (a.e.).
20 The quali…cation ”[i(e;z)+¤ ( e;z)] large enough” pecludes situations in which …rms invest only very
rarely very small amounts. In such situations any increase in frequency would have virtually no e¤ect on the
investment rate. (Consider the extreme case of a …rm that invests some " ! 0 with probability 0.5+0.5e.
Though there is a substantial frequency e¤ect, the semi-elasticity is close to 0.5+0.5e times the change in the
typical investment of an investing …rm.





z: Therefore, we can state:
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@ ln(z) : (22)
Although the sign of these terms is not clear from analytic grounds, we would expect for
negative ln(z), the e¤ect of equity on the optimal capital stock to be decreasing in e,t h ea d -
justment hazard to be decreasing in z and the expected investment to be a decreasing function
of z; too. Hence, intuitively
@2i(e;z)
@ ln(e)@ ln(z) < 0 if i is positive.
2.4 Discriminating between our model and alternatives
The above theorem and remark are central in discriminating between the model of this paper
and both, the Myers and Majluf (1984) pecking-order of …nance and the liquidity-dependent
cost of capital (but convex adjustment cost) models: In the liquidity-dependent cost of capital
models with convex adjustment costs the long-run e¤ect is clearly dominant. Any e¤ect of
liquidity on the speed of adjustment in these models is only a second-order e¤ect. Slower
adjustment marginally saves internal funds, so that the marginal gains of faster adjustment
and the marginal-costs of internal funds have to be equalized. Therefore, liquidity can have an
in‡uence on the adjustment speed only via the second-order derivative of the costs of capital
w.r.t. liquidity. In the …xed adjustment cost model however, investment is an extramarginal
decision. Given any …xed cost of investment, a change in liquidity hence may render some
projects unpro…table, so that there is a …rst-order e¤ect of liquidity on the adjustment speed.
Whether the debt-ceiling or the liquidity dependence of the cost of capital is more im-









@e should be close to equal. In this case most of the e¤ect of …-
nance on investment frequency comes from rendering some investment projects unpro…table.
If the debt-ceiling is the important …nancial friction, @i




substantially. Here, liquididity corresponds to a number of investment options a …rm can
expect to have at most over some given period of time. The smaller the number of options
is, the larger the value of each option will be. This option-value adds another factor to the
…xed cost of adjusting the stock of capital.
In the pecking-order model there is an important short run e¤ect of liquidity independent
of the form of adjustment costs. In these models when adjustment costs are concave typically
three regimes of …rm-…nance emerge.22 These are stylized in …gure 1.
The …rms with a high z (low productivity of investment) are …nancially unconstrained,










Figure 1: A stylized version of the pecking-order model
rely on internal …nance, and their investment decision is independent of their liquidity con-
straint. Firms with low z rely on external …nance and depending on the form of transaction
costs, investment of these …rms can be sensitive to liquidity. Firms with intermediate z are
strictly constrained by liquidity and a change in liquidity changes investment. Firms with
high productivity rely on external …nance. For these …rms increasing equity either has no
e¤ect or actually reduces the sensitivity of investment with respect to fundamentals, be-
cause these …rms become liquidity constrained when equity rises. This can happen since the
gains of obtaining external …nance get smaller, the larger the internally …nanced amount of
investment is. Therefore, the cross-derivative
@2i(e;z)
@ ln(e)@ ln(z) would be positive. Consequently,
Theorem 1(b) and Remark 1 can be used to test the model of this paper against (simpler)
pecking-order alternatives.23 Another possibility to discriminate between …xed cost of in-
vestment and …xed cost of external …nance models is the investment behavior for z > 1 :
Fixed disinvestment costs imply a range of inactivity, while transaction costs of …nance yield
immediate disinvestment, if …rms can hold …nancial assets. In that sense, even if we later es-
timate the investment function non-parametrically and even if the estimated derivatives have
no structural interpretation in the form of coe¢cients of an adjustment-cost function, we can
identify the various investment models using …rst- and higher-order derivatives. Moreover,
in its general formulation, the model nests the alternative models as it only partially di¤ers
23 This argument, however, only holds if transaction costs in a pecking-order model are deterministic.
If transaction costs are stochastic, cross-sectional aggregation of the short run investment function may be
governed by the distribution of transaction costs, which - if chosen from a set of arbitrary distributions - can
have a dynamics similar to the one of our model as a result.
14with respect to the ”test objects” mentioned.
2.5 Aggregate investment and its dynamics
One obtains the time-series of aggregate investment by aggregating over the distribution of







where fzje denotes the conditional density of capital-imbalances and fe denotes the cross-
section density of the equity-to-capital ratio. f shall denote their common density.






and i(e;z) be independent in (e;z).

















Given equation (24), aggregate investment is fully determined by the distribution of eq-
uity and the conditional distribution of capital-imbalances. The dynamics of the aggregate
investment series is then determined by the transition from f(¢;t) to f(¢;t+1 ) : 25
3 Empirical evidence
3.1 Measuring the capital imbalance
To test our model of interacting frictions against the alternatives mentioned, we will need an
approach that nests the alternative models. Yet, this precludes any very structural approach,
but forces us to rely on the reduced form representation of the two-step approach of Caballero
et al. (1995). In this approach the capital imbalance z as a proxy of fundamental investment
incentives is estimated in a …rst step. Thereafter, we regress investment on this proxy and the
equity-ratio, to obtain the (short-run) expected investment function. However, without spec-
ifying the distributions involved one obtains no closed form representation of an investment
24 See Caballero and Engel (1999, p. 816) for a detailed numerical justi…cation of a closely related
assumption.
25 NOTE FOR THE REFEREE: The dynamics of aggregate investment can be generated by the system
described in Appendix R1.
15function, but only predictions on its …rst- and second-order derivatives to discriminate be-
tween the alternative models. To account for this, we will employ non-parametric estimation
techniques and base our inference on the non-parametric average derivative estimates.
The …rst intermediate goal of this section is hence to construct an estimator for the
capital-imbalance z: In contrast to Caballero et al. (1995), it cannot be assumed that the
desired capital is proportional to the stock of capital K¤ t h a tap l a n tw o u l dh o l di nt h e
absence of adjustment costs.W e k n o w t h a t z and e enter only multiplicatively in zopt:
Taking logs of all variables except for i(e;z) (without changing notation), we then can
write the optimal capital imbalance, as de…ned in the previous chapter, as a function in
two arguments. Abusing notation slightly, we replace zopt(w;e;z) by zopt(w;e + z): Under
the assumption that zopt is di¤erentiable a Taylor-approximation of zopt(w;e + z) around
zopt(0;0)—neglecting cross- and higher-order-derivatives with respect to e—yields for desired
capital e k (by the de…nition of z) :
zopt(w;e+ z)=~ kit ¡ k¤





®ijwj + ¯i(e + z) , (25)
In this equation sit denotes the logarithm of the stock of equity in the opening balance. Since





it. Furthermore, z can
be approximated by:26
¡zit = k¤
it ¡ kit = ´i [ln(bi)+yit ¡ kit ¡ µi e coit]; (26)
where k denotes log-capital employed, y denotes log-sales, e co denotes log cost-of-capital and









= ®i1 + ´i [yit ¡ kit ¡ µi e coit]+
¯i
1¡¯ieit + uit (27)
with ®i1 := ®i0
1¡¯i + ´i ln(bi)
Although a formal proof is not available so far, it is very likely that zopt ¡ z (conditional on
the predetermined e) is stationary, while y;k and e co are most likely to be non-stationary, so
that µ and ¯ can be estimated from a panel-cointegration regression (Caballero et al., 1995,
p. 15). Obviously better than just assuming (and even than proving within our model)
would be to test for a cointegration relation being present in the data. However, as the panel
data we have is large only along the cross-section- and not along the time series dimension,
such a test would be meaningless. Nevertheless, estimating the cointegrating vector should
26 See appendix 1 for details, especially for the de…nitions of bi and ´i.
16still be possible, as this is even possible in pure cross-sections (Madsen, 2001).27
Regarding (¯i;µi) we assume the cointegrating vector to be homogeneous (at least amongst
industries Indj): Thus (¯i;µi)=( ¯;µ)8i 2 Indj: Furthermore, since the number of param-
eters is larger than the number of predetermined variables, one needs to approximate ´i by
1
1¡°i and bi by °i; where °i is the cost share of equipment capital (Caballero et al., 1995, p.
15).
Given consistent estimators b µ;b ¯ (and b ®i0) it is then possible to compute z and estimate
i(e;z), f(e;z;t) non-parametrically.
3.2 Estimation procedure
For estimating the cointegration relation (28), Phillips’ and Moon’s (1999) ”full-modi…ed
panel cointegration estimator” (henceforth PFM-OLS) is used. This estimator is
p
nT-
consistent, asymptotic normal and corrects for possible endogeneity of the regressors.28
A drawback of the PFM-OLS estimator is that it is formulated for balanced panels with
integrated regressors only. The data we have is an unbalanced panel and at least for e
we would rather assume it to be an I(0) process. However, the PFM-OLS estimator is a
generalization of the full-modi…ed OLS estimator of Phillips and Hansen (1990) and Phillips
(1995) and hence we expect the results of Phillips (1995) to carry over to the panel-case as
well, i.e. the estimator is
p
nT-consistent and asymptotic normal for parameters of stationary
regressors. The standard errors will thus be calculated in analogy to the time-series case.
To account for the unbalancedness, the unbalanced-panel equivalents of all items that
appear in the formula of the estimator are calculated.29 For inference the average number of
observations per …rm is used. The equation we use for estimation is:




The time-dummies °t have been added for two reasons: First, the data that will be used
covers a period of large shocks to in‡ation, thus measuring the real interest rate correctly
is something to be concerned about. The second reason is that we do not have data on
taxational shocks—common to all …rms. The usual within transformation will be used to
remove time and individual e¤ects.
With the estimator of µ at hand, we can use (26) to calculate end-of-period t capital
27 Strictly speaking, of course we only estimate a long-run covariance. This covariance re‡ects the cointe-
gration relation if there is such a relation, which is what we assume.
28 See Appendix for the Referee (Note R3.3)
29 For example when estimating the short-run covariance matrix, we calcualte the covariance for every …rm
in the sample using the …rm-speci…c number of observations and then average over …rms.
For inference in the I(1)-regressor case we calculate con…dence bounds on the basis of T being the average
number of observations per …rm.
17imbalances ^ zt+1: From our model, we would need to know the beginning-of-period capital
imbalance which is unobservable. Of course one could simply subtract investment from ^ zt+1;
which would yield beginning-of-period z consistently with our model. However, subtracting
the regressand in generating the regressor is obviously problematic.30 Instead, we will simply
take b zt; as a proxy for zt.
In a second step, the investment rate ijt is regressed non-parametrically on (ejt;b zjt): To
compare the short- and long-run behavior, and to compare the results with other empirical
studies, average derivatives of i(e;z) a r ee s t i m a t e d ,a sw e l l . T h e s ea r et h ec o u n t e r p a r t st o
the coe¢cients estimated in linear models. However, as we only observe average z on the
company level, but not for every single plant, the second-order derivative of the investment
function in z will be underestimated if the function is convex, i.e. the function will appear
to be less curved than it is.
The nonparametric estimation procedure, that will be employed will basically be a
generalized-nearest neighborhood estimator. However, accounting for …rm-speci…c e¤ects
is not as straightforward for nonparametric estimation, as it is in the parametric one (Ullah
and Roy, 1998). To account for …xed e¤ects the investment function shall meet the following
assumption:
Assumption 5: For each …rm j at time t investment i is given by
ijt(zjt;e jt)=fi
jt + i(zjt ¡ fz
jt;e jt ¡ fe
jt)+vjt . (29)
Moreover, E(i(¢;¢)) = 0 (to identify i). fx
jt := (¹ xj: +¹ x:t ¡ ¹ x::) to remove …xed e¤ects.
Under this assumption the function i can be directly estimated using within-transformed
quantities only. Alternatively, the nonparametric …rst-derivative estimator of Ullah and Roy
(1998) could be applied. To obtain the investment function one has to integrate over the
derivatives. For estimating average derivatives however, we will also apply the estimator of
Ullah and Roy.
3.3 Data
The UK-data we employ is the BSO-dataset of the Cambridge/DTI Database.31 This
database contains annual accounting data from UK companies from 1976 to 1990. 50494
company-year observations are included in the data. About half of them come from man-
ufacturing …rms. For the subsequent analysis the dataset has been restricted to companies
30 In an earlier version of this paper, this approach has been taken and the results were qualitatively the
same.
31 See Goudi et al., 1985. The database is freely available by HMSO after registration. It covers a
representative sample of UK company accounts.
18of the manufacturing sector with positive …xed capital and positive equity. Moreover, only
…rms with 5 or more consecutive observations available remain in the sample. After removing
outliers (see below), the sample contains 7147 observations from 915 di¤erent …rms.32
The BSO dataset contains capital and investment data for land and buildings as well as
for tools and machinery. Since reported depreciation rates for machinery are about 40%, we
restrict the analysis to land and buildings.33 All data have been de‡ated to 1975 prices using
the retail-price-index (RPI).
The user-cost of capital are computed as the average reported depreciation rate (on land
and buildings) for each …rm ±i plus the real interest-rate (reported in table 1). But then a
fraction sit of the investment spending is payed for by subsidies. In consequence, this fraction
has to be subtracted from the cost:
e coit =l n ( ( ±i + rt)(1 ¡ sit)): (30)
The real interest series is obtained by subtracting annual in‡ation rate (on the basis of
RPI) from 3-month Euro-sterling deposit rates. Due to the logarithmic transformation the
real-interest rate shocks are not completely removed by the time-dummies.
The data on subsidies is problematic as we obtain sit ¸ 1 for a few …rm-years. Therefore,
all these observation are removed by discarding all observations with cost-of capital below
the 4% and above the 99.5% quantile.34;35
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the variables of the sample that we use. The
within transformation is calculated before taking …rst di¤erences, and thus before loosing
the …rst observation for each …rm. Hence, the regressors do not have mean zero exactly.
In the introduction we brie‡y summarized the recent literature on q-theoretic empirical
investment models which has highlighted the role of measurement errors. Although the
analysis does not rely on q, in two other systematic ways a measurement error might be
present in the cost series. The …rst is a systematic risk e¤ect, the second would be a di¤erence
between our constructed real interest series and the real interest rate on debt. If …rms have
di¤erent idiosyncratic risks, their costs of capital are di¤erent. If risk enters capital costs
32 T h e r ea r em i s s i n go b s e r v a t i o n sf o rf e w… r m sd u et ot h ew a yo u t l i e r sa r er e m o v e d ,i . e . w eh a v ea n
observation in t¡1 and in t+1 but the observation in t is removed. The within-transformation we use takes
care of this, but we simply neglect this fact for the following regressions. More strictly, we either would have
to take the whole time series for the …rm out of the sample or at least treat observations after the outlier and
before di¤erently. However, in any case we would lose quite many observations.
33 Although our model might still hold true for fast depreciating capital goods, we would need data at a
higher frequency to sensibly analyse the data. At a depreciation rate of 50% capital goods are replaced on
average every second year on a regular basis, if the stock of capital stays constant. Hence, we can expect to
hardly …nd any in‡uence of …xed costs in yearly data.
34 Additionally, we remove observations with the 0.05% highest or lowest costs after the within
transformation.
35 See Appendix for the Referee (Note R3.5)
19Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the quantities used
(within-transformed)
full sample removing …rst obs. (as in PFM-OLS)
min max std
´y ¡5:655 3:438 0:326
´k ¡3:389 6:302 0:486
´ e co ¡:4233 0:627 0:075
e ¡2:414 1:585 0:210
´a 0:617 1:000 0:026
zb ¡5:680 4:775 0:358
i ¡10:37 0:778 0:514
mean min max std
´(y ¡ k)0 :001 ¡5:648 4:956 0:383
´e co ¡0:004 ¡:4233 0:627 0:062
e 0:0005 ¡2:414 1:585 0:209
before individual demeaning
z ¡4:08 ¡10:66 1:716 0:796
ic 0:339 ¡0:936 8:115 0:571
aNot demeaned
bAfter removing individual e¤ects, the correlation of capital-imbalance and equity-ratio is about 0.032
cGross-investment, calculated as annual di¤erences of reported capital stocks.
multiplicatively, however, the …xed e¤ects perfectly control for this (if risk is constant over
time), otherwise they still should do most to remove the measurement-error bias.36 The
same argument also holds true for di¤erences between the real-interest series used and the
relevant real-interest series for …rm debt.
3.4 Long-run optimal stock of capital
Table 2 reports estimates of (28) for the whole dataset as well as for the industries for which
many observations are available. These are Food (21), Chemicals (26), Non-electrical engi-
neering (33), Electrical Engineering (36), Paper, Printing & Publishing (48) and Transport
& Communication (50). The standard errors are given in parentheses.
The estimated long-run elasticity of capital with respect to the user-costs is with 0.9752
statistically insigni…cantly di¤erent from 1. The elasticity with respect to the equity-ratio is
with ·
·+1 =0 :077 statistically signi…cant under both the I(0) and I(1) assumption for e.37 If
the equity-ratio in‡uences the long-run stock of capital through in‡uencing the marginal cost
of …nance (interest rate on debt), these estimates imply an elasticity of the cost of …nance
with respect to the equity-ratio that is equal to ·
µ ' 0:081; which is only moderate.
The OLS-estimates for the elasticity with respect to equity is slightly lower than the
PFM-OLS-estimate. This is quite in line with what one would expect: High realizations of
z induce losses and will therefore lower the equity-ratio. Other explanations, such as older
…rms being less productive and more equity …nanced are mostly controlled for by the …xed
e¤ect. Although there are di¤erences among subsample estimates these are insigni…cant,
36 Note that obviously, if …nancial frictions determine the cost of capital, our measure of costs measures
with an error. However, the residual is just explained by the parameter of equity in our regression.
37 If e exhibits lag-dependency, however, the parameter-estimate of ¯ may be biased. In section 4.3 this
issue is discussed in more detail using the German dataset. For the German data, we show the bias from
lag-dependency to be negative, if present.
20Table 2: Estimates from the cointegration regression
(PFM-OLS, Within)




PFM-OLSa 0:079 0:98 5944
prelim. OLS 0:070 1:08
std. err. I(1) 0:026 0:07
std. err. I(0)b 0:035 0:14




21 PFM 0.191 1.73** 471
OLS 0.136 1.340 554
26 PFM 0.108 1.119 760
OLS 0.097 0.738 897
33 PFM 0.020 0.32** 836
OLS -0.019 0.075 1065
36 PFM 0.164 0.957 534
OLS 0.209 0.443 626
48 PFM -0.037 0.991 410
OLS -0.047 0.570 493
50 PFM 0.296 0.627 378
OLS 0.156 0.637 482
aOnly observational units have been used for which (outliers removed) 5 or more observations are available.
bThe standard errors are obtain as panel analogues to Phillips (1995, p. 1033¤).
cFull industry-sample OLS estimates are reported in brackets ( ).
** Signi…cantly di¤erent from the remaining-sample-estimate at the 5%-level - based
on PFM-OLS estimate under the assumption of an I(1)-regressor.
except for two estimates. Therefore, we conclude the model to be reasonably speci…ed as a
homogeneous panel.
Compared to the estimates of Caballero et al. (1995) the PFM-OLS estimates of the
cost-elasticity are much closer to its neoclassical-theory value of 1. Moreover, the variation
between the industry speci…c estimates is slightly smaller.
With the regression estimates it is now possible to construct a time series b zit for each
…rm. The series is constructed using all 7147 observations.38
3.5 Investment behavior
3.5.1 Density and conditional expectations estimates
Since the structure of our investment model is highly nonlinear and the functional forms of
the pro…t function and distributions involved are not quite clear, a nonparametric estimation
is most fruitful.39
38 However, 3% of the observations were discarded as outliers with respect to the within transformed
investment-rate. We do so by removing the top 0.5 % observations and the bottom 2.5 %.
39 The non-parametric estimates presented in this section were generated in autumn 2000. At that time,
computational e¤ort of the variable window width estimator still played some role . This forced us to rely
on less computational intense estimation techniques, such as k-nn estimators. At the time, the estimates
presented in section 4.3 were generated (Spring 2003), this issue was of much lesser importance, as the
computer system available then was about 10 times faster.
21Figure 2 shows the distribution of within transformed investment rates conditional on the
capital-imbalance b z. The distribution has been estimated with a normal-kernel estimator and
a …xed window width of 0:12 £ n¡1
6; both z and i have been standardized. The relationship
is as expected: Firms with lower z invest more. More surprisingly and in line with the model
the distribution of investment rates has two peaks for high mandated investments.
For …rms with an unproductive capital stock, we …nd three peaks in the distribution, one
where no disinvestment occurs, one with partial (unconstrained optimal) disinvestment and
one peak for nearly full disinvestment, being again perfectly in line with the model. However,
these …ndings are on the boundary of the support, where the estimator becomes less reliable.
Figure 2: Density of the investment-rate distribution conditional on z
However the distributional …ndings are not completely supportive: Most …rms do by
far not remove their capital-imbalance completely in case they invest. One explanation
for this could be time-to build constraints which cause investment to be spread over two
accounting periods. Another explanation is that many of the …rms in our sample are large
…rms. These are themselves aggregates of many establishments. Therefore, given z;the model
presented above would yield an approximate investment rate of n
mi(e;z) for a company with
m independent establishments of which n establishments adjust: The distribution of n would
22then be given by a binomial distribution B with:40
P(njz;e)=B(njm;G(­(e;z))
When the number m of establishments per …rm is large enough we would expect to hardly
ever see zero investment rates for larger z in our model.
Moreover, if heterogeneous capital goods indeed matters, aggregation over these goods
will result in a downward bias of second order derivatives. (Goolsbee and Gross, 2000).
Figure 3: Expected investment-rate i conditional on e and z (demeaned)
Figure 3 presents the expected investment rates conditional on the log equity-to-capital
ratio and mandated investment. For the estimation a 360-nearest neighborhood (k-NN), local
linear, Epanechnikov-kernel estimator has been used. The choice of k =3 6 0is approximately
equivalent to twice the …xed window-width used for density estimation.41 The window-
width has been chosen by ”eye-balling”, but tends to slightly undersmooth the conditional
expectation estimator on the center of the support. Especially for second order-derivative
estimation, this problem becomes much more apparent. Therefore, when estimating second-
order derivatives (see below), a combination of 720-nearest-neighborhood and …xed window-
width (of h =4 n¡1=10) kernel is used. This e¤ectively approximates variable window-width
40 Note that, investment decisions in heterogeneous capital goods as in Goolsbee and Gross (2000) or for
di¤erent establishments or plants of one company would - strictly speaking - not be independent in our model,
as investment decisions are linked through their e¤ect on the balance sheet.
41 The optimal k for k-NN estimators and the optimal window-width h are linked by k = nh
4=6 in the two
dimensional case (Pagan and Ullah, 1999, p. 91).
23Figure 4: Estimates for the generalized additive model
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estimators, but is computationally much faster.
Figure 3 shows, that the investment function is nonlinear in a manyfold sense: For a large
equity-ratio, investment is a convex function of the capital-imbalance, highly indebted …rms
investment mostly only disinvest and for these …rms investment is concave in fundamentals.
In our model this is a result of the concavity of the earnings-function and the …xed costs.
A higher equity-ratio raises investment, but only when fundamentals allow so.42 Therefore,
this results supports our pecking-order, …xed-adjustment-cost model. Moreover, for very low
productivity equity-ratio …rst has to reach some threshold to in‡uence investment, i.e. to
stop sharp disinvestment. Again this is very much in line with our pecking-order, …xed-cost
model. And as a last (but not really surprising) deviation from the linear model, the second
o r d e rd e r i v a t i v eo fe q u i t ys e e m st ob en e g a t i v e ,a tl e a s tf o rl o wz.
To better visualize the e¤ect of ignoring the important interaction of equity and capital-
imbalance and thus the non-linear structure for investment, the generalized additive model
E[ij(e;z)] = m1(z)+m2(e) (31)
has also been estimated.
Figures 4(a) and (b) now present the estimates for the generalized additive model. As
the identifying restriction in a generalized additive model is arbitrary, we employ di¤erent
restrictions for …gures 4(a) and 4(b): While in …gure 4(a) E[m2(e) ]=0was used, in …gure
4(b) E[m1(z) ]=0is chosen. This makes it easier to visualize the relative changes in the
investment rate caused by changes in z and e. Still there is some sign of non-linearity of
investment in z. However, this is very minor, as in general the function is close to linear.
Clearly this shows, how misleading it can be if one neglects (non-linearity and) cross-e¤ects.
42 Note that we have not included any long-run e¤ect of equity in generating the capital imbalance estimates.
24Figure 5: Generalized additive model, untransformed data




























(a) full sample: m2(e)



























(b) restricted sample: m2(e)
T h i sb i a sb e c o m e se v e nw o r s ef o rt h ee s t i m a t eo fm2(e) in …gure 4(b).
For low equity-ratios there is no e¤ect, whereas for high equity-ratios the e¤ect is clearly
positive. However, we have seen a clearly positive e¤ect for low equity as soon as productivity
is high enough. Moreover from …gure 3, this e¤ect is decreasing if equity rises, while in …gure
4(b) it is increasing in e: This no-e¤ect result, when equity is low, has appeared in earlier
studies in the form of apriori as …nancially constrained considered …rms reacting less on
increases in cash ‡ow (Kaplan and Zingales, 1997). Therefore, …gure 4(b) sheds some new
light on these results, too: It may well be that a misspeci…cation bias drives this evidence that
has been brought forward as an argument against …nancial constraints playing a prominent
role in investment decisions.
The e¤ect of the within transformation can be seen, when comparing …gures 4(a) and (b)
to …gure 5(a) and 5(b), where we report the estimates without transformation. This allows
to use the full dataset and not only …rms with at least …ve observations, therefore, the full
dataset has been used for the estimates in …gure 5(a). For …gure 5(b) the restricted dataset
was used.
Interestingly, the e¤ect seems to be U-shaped. This could be due to some underlying
economic structure or to the unreliability of nonparametric estimates near the boundary of
the support. If there is an economic explanation for this, it has to rely on …rm- or industry-
characteristics of the very indebted …rms. If there is an economic explanation, it has to
rely on …rm- or industry charcteristics of the very indebted …rms. Yet, an exact analysis is
beyond the scope of this paper.
3.5.2 Average derivative estimators
A major drawback of the nonparametric estimates are their wide con…dence bounds. Thus,
to draw more reliable conclusions, it is necessary to estimate average derivatives of i(z;e)=
25E(ijz;e) directly. This yields much closer con…dence bounds because nonparametric average-
derivative estimators converge with parametric rates of convergence (Rilstone, 1991). The
estimates are reported in tables 3 and 4.
Several nonparametric estimators for the average derivative are available in our panel data
setting (Ullah and Roy, 1998). We concentrate on derivative estimates from a local linear
estimation which is basically a locally weighted version of an OLS estimator and derived from
a …rst order Taylor expansion around the point (z;e), at which the function is estimated, i.e.
ijt = E(ijz;e)+( zjt ¡ z)bz (z;e)+( ejt ¡ e)be (z;e)+ujt . (32)





as their direct estimates. The weights are generated according to the kernel-
function chosen. Both estimators are asymptotically normally distributed, but have a di¤er-
ent variance. Moreover, in small samples the bias is di¤erent and they perform di¤erently. In
most cases the numerical estimator b¤ should be preferable (Ullah and Roy, 1998). However,
a drawback of this estimator is that the variance of its averaged form is not yet known (Pagan
and Ullah, 1999). Both estimators use the within transformed data for the regressions and
for evaluating the kernel.
In our panel data setting, additionally the …xed e¤ects estimator of Ullah and Roy (1998)
is available.43 This estimator bFE uses the within transformed data for the regression but
calculates the weights with the kernel on the basis of the original data. The advantage of
this estimator is that assumption 5 is no longer needed to let the estimates be interpretable
in a sensible manner. All we need to assume is the investment function to exhibit …xed
idiosyncratic and time e¤ects and to be otherwise homogenous among the …rms in the original
(not within transformed) quantities. As we will see below, results do not qualitatively depend
on the estimator chosen.
The average derivative estimators are generated as the mean of the pointwise estimates.
Average-derivatives over a subset of observations are calculated by using the conditional
mean (conditional on the observation falling into the subsample) and not by re-estimating
for the subsample.
The cross- and higher-order-derivatives are computed as numerical estimates of these
quantities using (32). As for the …rst-order derivative numerical estimator the asymptotic
variance is not yet known.
For the second-order-derivatives the undersmoothing of the nearest neighborhood estima-
tor in the center of the distribution becomes a more apparent problem. Therefore, we generate
the weights (kernel) in the local linear regression as average of a 720 nearest-neighborhood
43 Note that we also use within-transformed data in estimating (32):
26Table 3: Average …rst-order derivatives of the investment rate i(e;z)










@z 0:5057 0:5146 0:5341 0:5137 0:0068
@b i
@e 0:1555 0:1588 0:1782 0:1450 0:0097
aestimated with a mixture of …xed window-width and 720-NN-Kernel.
Epanechnikov kernel and a …xed window-width Epanechnikov kernel with h = n¡1=10.T h i s
practically gives a variable window-width, which is neither too small on the border nor on the
center of the support, so that the estimator should not be too heavily under- or oversmoothed.
Furthermore and within a certain range, window-width selection has been reported to be of
a lesser issue for average derivative estimators, as they are generally not too sensitive to
window-width selection,44 as long as the averages are not dominated by a few outliers.
3.5.3 Average derivative estimates
The average derivative estimates for all four estimators are reported in table 3. Although the
various estimators yield quantitatively slightly di¤erent estimates, they qualitatively do not
di¤er: Both the equity-ratio and the capital-imbalance have a signi…cant e¤ect. Moreover
and more surprisingly, the derivative with respect to the equity-ratio is about twice as large
as the elasticity of the optimal stock of capital with respect to the equity-ratio. The di¤erence
is both economically and statistically signi…cant. This also holds true if one requests higher
levels of signi…cance to account for the dependence of the short-run and long-run estimates:45
Therefore, …nance matters both in the short and in the long-run but in‡uences the frequency
of adjustment much stronger, than the optimal stock of capital.
Table 4 reports the higher-order derivative estimates and reveals some interesting results
as well: We …nd a clear evidence for convexity in z for both the total sample average and
the local averages over low z. Moreover and as predicted by the theoretical model, for low
z the cross-derivative is clearly negative. Therefore, all empirical results are in line with the
investment model that includes …xed adjustment cost and capital market imperfections.
Hence, we can conclude that all empirical results are in line with the investment model
that includes …xed adjustment cost and capital market imperfections.
44 See Pagan and Ullah (1999).
45 Taking the standard deviations as reported above and the asymptotic distributions as approximation,
the 5% one-sided upper con…dence bound for ¯ is 0.1368, while the lower 5% one-sided con…dence bound for
b
¤¤
e is 0.1425. If both estimators were independent, this would of course equal an one-sided 0.25% test.
27Table 4: Average second-order derivatives
of the investment rate i(e;z)
derivative full Samplea low zb high ec
@2i
@z2 0:2931 0:3838 0:3565
@2i
@e2 0:1079 ¡0:106 ¡0:150
@2i
@e@z 0:1078 ¡0:123 0:2257
N 6922 2284 2353
a e and z within the 0.5% and 99.5% quantiles .
b e within the 0.5% and 99.5%, z within the 0.5% and 33% quantiles.
c z within the 0.5% and 99.5%, e within the 66% and 99.5% quantiles.
4C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper a model of investment that incorporates an imperfect capital market and …xed
investment costs was presented. Even though no closed form was deduced and some questions
of stability in the sense of stationarity are still open to further research some new results were
obtained by analyzing that model. One major result was to identify the di¤erence between
a short-run e¤ect of liquidity on the frequency of investment and a long-run e¤ect on the
optimal stock of capital. While the standard agency or oligopoly models of investment and
…nance46 predict only a strong in‡uence of liquidity on the chosen stock of capital, the model
in this paper rather suggests a strong short-run e¤ect. This stronger short-run than long-run
in‡uence of the equity-to-capital ratio on investment, is exactly what is empirically found,
so that empirical evidence supports our theoretical model.
Furthermore, the investment rate is empirically a highly nonlinear function of the capital-
imbalance (investment opportunities) and equity (liquidity). Thus even only imposing ad-
ditive separability leads to a severe error. This error could well be the cause of the puz-
zling …nding reported in the literature that ”apriori unconstrained” …rms react stronger to
changes in their …nancial variables than constrained ones. For further empirical research, this
therefore suggest a need to estimate investment equations in a generalized error correction
framework47 as done in this paper.
The econometric approach taken in this paper to estimate the short-run dynamics (or
error correction function) has been a completely nonparametric one. Even though the …ndings
suggest a nonlinear investment function, a nonlinear, but (more) parametric approach might
produce additional insights. Especially in discriminating between a transaction cost of …nance
model and a …xed adjustment cost model, the approach taken seems only a …rst step. More
research is needed to clarify the quantitative importance of both.
46 See e.g. Myers (1977) or Brander and Lewis (1986).
47 See e.g. de Jong (2001).
28Our model also has important policy implications: Suppose there are shocks to the
balance sheet positions of …rms (e.g. through exchange rates as in Céspedes et al. (2000),
Aghion et al. (2001) or Devereux and Lane (2001)), then this paper’s model predicts a
much stronger short run real impact of these shocks than the usual …nancial accelerator
model of Bernanke et al. (1998). Moreover, this impact will depend on the position of the
economy along the business cycle. Thus—if …xed adjustment cost are present—policies that
in‡uence the balance sheet (shocks) will be di¤erently rated along the business cycle and also
di¤erently compared to the convex adjustment cost framework. Therefore e.g. the central
bank not only should try to observe the distribution of capital-imbalances, but also consider
the …nancial situation of …rms, in order to predict policy implications. More speci…cally both
e¤ects cannot be considered separately as the magnitude of each e¤ect depends on the state
of the other variable.
Another example for policy implications would be a (corporate) tax reform. There the
implications on the costs of retaining earnings have to be taken into account,too, since a rise
in the average equity-to-capital ratio, not only raises investment in the short run, but would
also - at least in the partial model presented here - increase e¢ciency, as average (absolute)
capital-imbalances would fall.
295A p p e n d i c e s
In this appendix, we derive the Bellman equation which is central to our model. Thereafter,
we show the existence and uniqueness of a solution to this equation. At the end of this
appendix, some properties of the induced optimal-policy function are discussed.
5.1 Deriving the Bellman Equation
All variables, functions etc. are de…ned as in the main text, unless stated di¤erently. The
correspondence, X; of …nancial feasible capital-imbalance and debt pairs is given by:
X (K¤
t ;w t;z t;B t)=
(
kt;B t+1 2 R2
+jD(kt;B t+1;K¤
t ;w t;z t;B t) ¸ 0





kt;B t+1 2 R2
+
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
(1 + r( Bt
Kt¡1))Bt ¡ ¦(kt;K¤
t )[1 ¡ wtIfkt6=ztg]
+K¤




Dividing the expression by K¤
t and using bt := Bt
Kt¡1 and for the stock of capital before
investment Kt¡1 = Kt
1¡± yields:
^ X (K¤
t ;w t;z t;b t): =
=
(
kt;b t+1 2 R++ £ R+
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
(1+r(bt))
1¡± btzt ¡ ¼(kt)[1 ¡ wtIfkt6=ztg]
+(kt ¡ zt) · bt+1kt · ^ bkt
)
[f (0;0)g (34)






De…ne furthermore c(z;b) to be the cash ‡ow per unit of capital (including cash ‡ow from
newly issued debt, and ”costs” for ”buying back” the capital stock), that is
ct := c(kt;b t+1)=
¼(kt)
kt
+( bt+1 ¡ 1):
We then get for ^ X :
^ X (K¤
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For et = e(bt) we have ^ X = Y [f (0;0)g:
Lemma 2 (Lemma 1 main text) (a) Y is non-empty and
( b )e m p l o y i n gz e r oc a p i t a li ss u b o p t i m a l ,i . e .
max
(kt;bt)2Y
~ v(kt;b t) ¡ ¼(kt)wtIfkt6=ztg >Ã Et[v(wt+1;0;0) > 0
Proof. (a) Obviously, etzt ¸ 0 holds, so it is su¢cient to show, that





x ¸ ¼0(x) since ¼ is concave , this ”self-…nancing” k¤ always
exists.
(b) Using k¤from part (a) a …rm can always pay out a larger dividend than et and can also
set bt =0 as well. By paying a larger dividend in the current period and having the same
debt as if it was to stop production but with a larger stock of capital, the expected value for
t +1must be larger than Et[v(wt+1;0;0)],s ot h a t
~ v(k¤;0;w t;z t;b t) >Ã Et[v(wt+1;0;0)]
follows. Because the plan 8t : kt = k¤(wt) is always feasible and leads to positive dividends,
v(¢) must be bounded from below by a positive real number, so that ÃEt[v(wt+1;0;0)] > 0:
Now denote the value-function by V:For notational convenience de…ne Y := Y (wt;z t;e(bt)):
31Then V is determined by the following Bellman equation:
V (K¤
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The …rst equality follows from the linear homogeneity in K¤ of the function D and the
linearity of the Et¡operator; the second equality stems from the fact, that e(bt)zt is no
function of (kt;b t+1) and is thus not a¤ected by the maximization. The third equality is




t =e x p ( d+»t+1) and kt(1¡±)=




t ¡e(bt)zt: Note that v does not depend on
K¤
t ; due to the homogeneity of V: Thus we obtain:






c(kt;b t+1)kt ¡ wtIfkt6=ztg¼(kt)+Ãe(bt+1)kt(1 ¡ ±)
+ÃEt[v(wt+1;k t
(1¡±)





Maximizing v is by de…nition equivalent to maximizing V:
5.2 Existence and uniqueness
From now on time-indices will be suppressed. Due to Lemma 1 we can drop ”no production”
from the set of alternatives X and express the value function v as




















maxfVno adj(z;e);V adj (w;z;e)g
Vadj (w;z;e)
for Z 6= ;
for Z = ;
(40)
32with








































Assumption A.6: ¹» := ÃE[exp(» + d)] < 1:48
Lemma 3 Consider the operator T de…ned by posing (Tv)(w;z;e) equal to the right hand
side of (39). This operator is de…ned on the set B of all real-valued, a.e. continuous and
bounded functions with domain D =[ 0 ;1] £ R+ £ R+
Then the mapping T (a) preserves boundedness, (b) preserves continuity a.e., and (c) satis…es
Blackwell´s conditions.
Proof. (a) To show that T preserves boundedness, one has to show that for any bounded
function u (Tu)(¢) is bounded.
Consider u 2 B; that is bounded from above by u and bounded from below by u,t h e n (Tu)(¢)
is bounded from above because
(Tu)(w;z;e) · ¹»u +s u p
(k;b)2Y (w;z;e)
©
c(k;b) ¡ w¼(k)Ifk6=ztg +(1¡ ±)Ãe(b)k
ª
· ¹»u +s u p
0·k;0·b·b b
fc(k;b)+( 1¡ ±)Ãe(b)kg
= ¹»u +s u p
0·k;0·b·b b
f[1 ¡ Ã(1 + i(b))]bk + ¼(k) ¡ (1 ¡ Ã(1 ¡ ±))kg
· ¹»u +s u p
0·k;0·b·b b
f(1 ¡ Ã)k + ¼(k) ¡ (1 ¡ Ã(1 ¡ ±))kg
= ¹»u +s u p
0·k
f¼(k) ¡ Ã±kg
where the supremum is bounded, because ¼(k) ¡ Ã±k obtains its maximum, as
lim
k!0
¼(k) ¡ Ã±k > 0 > lim
k!1
¼(k) ¡ Ã±k
48 This assumption is equivalent to assumption A.6 in Caballero and Engel (199, p. 811). Assume »
is normally distributed with variance ¾






< 1 + r:
Approximately, this is r ¡ d>
¾2
2 : Economicly this means that productivity and hence value of a given stock
of capital grows at a smaller rate than the market rate of return.
Suppose, this assumption would not hold and neglect adjustment costs for the moment. It is easy to see that
a …rm could obtain in…nite expected value by choosing a stock of capital that is small enough to reproduce
its depreciation plus the interest rate in the …rst period. In the next period it can be expected, that this
stock of capital (depreciated capital replaced) generates a positive pro…t, which grows at a larger rate than
the interest rate.
In this sense, assumption 1 is an equilibrium condition for the capital-market.
33by assumption. The third inequality follows from i(b) ¸ 0;0 · b b<1:
That (Tu)(¢) is bounded from below follows from
(Tu)(w;z;e) ¸ ¹»u +s u p
(k;b)2Y (w;e;z)
©
c(k;b) ¡ w¼(k)Ifk6=ztg +( 1¡ ±)Ãe(b)k
ª
>¹ »u
where the last inequality follows straightforward from the proof of Lemma 3.1.
(b) First note that for every u; that is continuous a.e. the parameter integrals in (40) are
continuous. Then (Tu)(w;z;e) is continuous because of Berge´s Theorem since Y is a contin-
uous correspondence and Z is continuous except for (e;z) 2 A := f(m;n)jm =( 1¡b b)¡
¼(n)
n g:
But as A is a curve in R2 it has measure of 0,s o(Tu) is continuous a.e.
(c) To show that T satis…es Blackwell´s conditions, one …rst notes that if f1;f 2 2 B and if
8(w;z;e) 2 D : f1(w;z;e) · f2(w;z;e); then (because exp(d + ») > 0) the expected value in
(40) preserves the inequality; and so does the max-function. Thus
(Tf1)(w;z;e) · (Tf2)(w;z;e)
A simple calculation shows, that
(Tf+ a)(w;z;e)=( Tf)(w;z;e)+¹»a
Assumption A.6 now yields the second Blackwell condition.
Proposition 1 Equation (39) has exactly one solution (which belongs to B).
Proof. Lemma A.1 yields that T de…nes a contraction mapping on the metric space B
with a modulus strictly smaller than one. The existence and uniqueness now follows from
the contraction mapping theorem (See Theorem 3.2 in Stockey, Lucas and Prescott, 1989)
5.3 Optimal policy
Now de…ne the following functions related to the solution of the Bellman equation of v(w;z;e)
in the main text.















34Proof. As v satis…es the Bellman-equation it must be bounded. However, since












always hold, J must be bounded, too.
Corollary 1 b Jmax(z;e): = s u p
b2Z(z;e)




Lemma 5 (a) J and Jmax are strictly monotonously decreasing in w:
(b) J(z;e;w)+w¼(z) is independent of w;
(c) Jmax and b Jmax(z;e) (and therefore v; too) are monotonously increasing in e:
Proof. (a) For any w1;w 2 2 [0;1] : w1 <w 2 we have:
J(z;b;w2)=c(z;b) ¡ w2¼(z)+( 1¡ ±)Ãe(b)z + I(z;b)
<c (z;b) ¡ w1¼(z)+( 1¡ ±)Ãe(b)z + I(z;b)
= J (z;b;w1)
And since Y2 := Y (w2;z;e) ½ Y (w1;z;e)= :Y1; we get:








(b) follows directly from the de…nition of J;
(c) since both Z and Y strictly grow with e this follows straightforward.
Proposition 2 De…ne for Z 6= ; as an implicit function w(z;e) by
Jmax(w;z;e) ¡ b Jmax(z;e)=0
Then …rms adjust if their current adjustment cost factor w is smaller than w(z;e) or if
Z = ;:
Proof. That a unique w(z;e) equating Jmax and b Jmax exists, follows from Jmax(0;z;e) ¸
b Jmax(z;e) 8(z;e) together with the monotonicity of Jmax in w:
As argued in the main text …rms adjust if Z = ; or Jmax(w;z;e) > b Jmax(z;e).S i n c eJmax is
monotonously decreasing in w this inequality holds if and only if w<w:
Proposition 3 J(z;b;w) is analytic and thus the set Q of (k;b) 2 b Y (w;e) \f k ¸ k¤g
35(Lemma 3.1) such that J(k;b;w)=Jmax(w;z;e) is a non-empty set with a …nite number of
points.
Proof. To show that J is analytic it su¢ces to show that I is analytic. Therefore note
















However, as K is integrable, the convolution of K and a normal density is analytic (see e.g.
Theorem 9 on p. 59 in Lehmann (1986)).
As J is analytic is must be continuous, too. Since Y (w;z;e) is compact this ensures that J
attains its maximum within a non-empty compact set Q: Since J is analytic the maxima are
isolated, so that Q contains a …nite number of elements.
Proposition 4 The function w(z;e) is analytic on the open and convex set C := n
(e;z) 2 R2




: Therefore ­(z;e) is analytic a.e. and so has derivatives of
all order on R2
+nA
Proof. The proposition follows straightforward from proposition A.3, the di¤erentiability
of the functions constructing Y; the implicit-function- and the envelope-theorem.
5.3.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Theorem 2 (Theorem 1 main text) (a) If [i(e;z)+¤ ( e;z)] is large enough - but possibly
smaller than one - then the investment rate is more sensitive to the equity-ratio than the
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e ¢ i(e;z)=[ i(e;z)+¤ ( e;z)]´
zopt
e + ´¤





@e > 0( < 0); now let e increase marginally then we have for some …rms an
increase (decrease) in realized z. Now assume contradictory
@2i(e;e zopt(e;z)))
@e@z > 0( < 0); then
investment rates would rise (fall) further, contradicting e zopt to be optimal. Thus the stated
inequality must hold.
5.4 Approximation of the optimal stock of capital
Suppose a …rm produces with a production function is of the Cobb-Douglas-type and with
two Input factors k and l; then - taking logarithms:















Therefore a Taylor-extension of the …rst order condition yields:
y(k¤;l¤(k¤)) + ln(b)
! = k¤ +l n ( r)
() y(k;l(k)) + (b + c
@l¤
@k
)(k¤ ¡ k)+l n ( b)=k¤ +l n ( r)
After some calculations one gets
k¤ ¡ k =
µ
1 ¡ c
1 ¡ b ¡ c
¶
(y ¡ k +l n ( b) ¡ ln(r))







49 See Caballero et al. (1995, p. 37) for details.
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Aggregate investment dynamics
Appendix for the Referee
Abstract
This is an appendix to the paper ”Aggregate Investment dynamics when …rms face …xed investment
cost and capital market imperfections”. In this appendix some lengthy footnotes that are omitted
in the main text are reproduced, the data for the aggregate variables used is displayed and the way
investment evolves in the time-series domain is derived in detail.
Christian Bayer
Universität Dortmund, Graduiertenkolleg ”Allokationstheorie, Wirtschaftspolitik und kollektive
Entscheidungen”,Vogelpothsweg 87, D-44227 Dortmund,
phone: +49-231-755-5403, fax: +49-231-755-5404, e-mail: christian.bayer@wiso.uni-dortmund.de1 Appendix R1 - Time series behavior of aggregate invest-
ment
To describe the time-series behavior of aggregate investment let the sequence of shocks/adjustment
be:
1. adjustment as described
2. idiosyncratic shocks »
3. aggregate shock vt and depreciation ±.
Denoting the density of idiosyncratic shocks by g(»), one can describe the transition from
f(¢;t¡ 1) to f(¢;t) as in Caballero et al. (1995, p. 35) by
f(e;z;t)=e f1
µ
















where H denotes the distribution of the stochastic variables O and P,w h i c ha r ed e … n e da s
Pjt := 1 + ijt ;O jt := 1 + (1 + r(bjt))bjt ¡
(1 + r(bjt))
1 ¡ ±
bjt¡1 ¡ Pjt ,
so that P i st h eg r o w t hr a t eo fc a p i t a l ,a n dO the change in leverage. Since wt are i.i.d., H
is stationary, so that combining (1) - (3) yields
f(e;z;t)=
Z
dH(o;pje ¢ p + o
p; z
pje ¢ o;z ¢ p)
£ f
³³
e ¢ p + o
p + ±
´





g(»)d»dodp .( 4 )
Therefore the aggregate investment series can be characterized as a generalized Markov-
chain. Note that because of the presence of aggregate shocks f is non-stationary.1 Further-
more, as H derives from the investment decision, we obtain from the aggregate investment
equation (maintext: 23)for the …rst two moments of P:
E(Pje;z)=i(e;z)+1 ; (5)
Va r(Pje;z)=Va r[i(e;z)]: (6)
1 If f were stationary in the absence of aggregate shocks, the density of disequilibria and equity to capital
ratios through which a …rm goes over its lifetime would be ergodic (Caballero and Engel (1992)). That is, if
the operator T de…ned below converges to a non-degenerated density.
(Tf)(e;z):=
Z






je ¢ o;z ¢ p)
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12 Appendix R2 - Prices, interest rates and in‡ation
Table 1: Nominal interest-rate i, real interest-rate r,
change in the RPI, de‡ator P
year 1975 76 77 78 79 80 81 82
i [%] 11.4 13.5 8.9 10.4 13.9 16.7 13.9 12.3
RPIt+1
RPIt
[%] 17 16 9 13 17 12 9 5
r [%] -4.75 -2.18 -0.09 -2.28 -2.65 4.22 4.53 6.93
P 1 1.17 1.357 1.479 1.672 1.956 2.191 2.388
year 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91
i [%] 10.1 10.0 12.2 11.0 9.7 10.3 13.9 14.8 11.5
RPIt+1
RPIt [ % ] 554456875
r [%] 4.89 4.72 7.91 6.70 4.48 4.07 5.46 7.26 6.22
P 2.507 2.632 2.764 2.875 2.990 3.139 3.327 3.594 3.845
3 Appendix R3 - Additional explanatory Footnotes
1. This value is given by
~ v(zopt(wt;e t);b opt(wt;e t)) ¡ wt¼(zopt(wt;e t)) :
2.
@2i(e;z)








e zopt + i
@´¤
e


























3. Yet, the consistency result is obtained by letting T (the time series dimension) and
n (the number of observations per individual) tend to in…nity sequentially, i.e. it is
a consistent estimator for samples which are larger along the time-series than along
the cross-sectional dimension. Nevertheless, the estimator should still be superior to
OLS. Moreover and mentioned before, Madsen (2001) shows, how inference on the
cointegrating vector can even be obtained from a cross-section in a similar framework.
4. Apriori might sound doubtful that the yearly average subsidy fraction sit is equal to
the expected marginal fraction of subsidies. In this sense, there could be a measurement
error problem present in this speci…cation. However, there are no obvious instruments
available and the actually estimated coe¢cient looks in no way biased downwards, as
it is insigni…cantly di¤erent from its theoretical value of 1.
2